

卷之三

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

JCS Declassification/Release
Instructions on File

MEMORANDUM OF INFORMATION NO. 26

20 February 1951

FOR: National Estimates Board

DOCUMENT NO. 26
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
 DECLASSIFIED 25X11
DECLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: 7 FEB 80 REVIEWER

Communist Forces in Korea

At the time the first large Chinese Communist offensive was launched in late November, an estimated 300,000 Chinese troops were in Korea. Far East Command estimated on 9 February that Chinese losses totaled 155,035 battle casualties, 22,104 non-battle casualties, and 912 PW's. Despite these heavy losses, the Chinese Communists are estimated to have approximately 284,000 troops in Korea at present, with 177,000 on line facing the US Eighth Army and 107,000 in the Nam-hung-Wonson area of northeast Korea. Far East Command estimated on 13 February that there were also 343,000 regular Chinese troops along the Yalu River, available for reinforcement on relatively short notice; unconfirmed reports indicate some of these troops have entered Korea and arrived in the central Korean combat area. In addition, there are an estimated 223,000 regular Chinese forces in more distant areas of Manchuria, plus a total of over 400,000 Military District troops available for service and replacement. Chinese combat efficiency has been restricted by severe logistical difficulties and dependence on small arms and light infantry support weapons.

The North Korean Army has undergone extensive reorganization, and major units have been formed, equipped with Soviet arms, and moved into North Korea from Manchuria since October 1950. Present estimates on North Korean strength vary, but it appears that present forces total at least 250,000 with 125,000 in contact with UN forces or immediately available, and the remainder in process of moving south from Manchuria. The North Koreans have suffered 401,751 casualties, including 136,000 PW's since June 1950, and it is believed that available replacements are few and of inferior quality.

Indications of Current Communist Intentions in Korea

There are several possible courses of action open to the Communists in Korea at the present time, including: (a) exerting a maximum effort to drive UN forces from Korea at the earliest possible time; (b) postponing a decisive campaign in order to cut losses while subjecting UN forces to attrition; (c) attempting to establish a stabilized defensive line and seeking a negotiated settlement; and (d) withdrawing Chinese forces wholly or in part for operations elsewhere,

GARDEN

~~SECRET~~

leaving the military mission to North Korean forces. The history of the Korean campaign and current factors both indicate that Chinese forces do not intend to withdraw and that the Communists do not intend to negotiate (except on terms they fully realize are unacceptable to the UN). On the basis of currently available evidence, it would appear that the Chinese are continuing and will continue their military efforts in Korea.

Communist forces in Korea at present do not have the capability of forcing an early UN withdrawal from the peninsula. That the Chinese Communists have not committed the balance of over 300,000 troops on the Manchurian border to combat, however, does not necessarily indicate any change in Communist intentions to force an early UN withdrawal. Rather it may indicate Chinese inability to sustain the cost or adequately maintain the employment of such added large-scale reinforcements in combat in Korea. Therefore, the present outlook is for an indefinite war of attrition.

The principal current indications of Communist intentions are:

- (1) The Chinese Communist commander-in-chief recently reiterated that the Chinese "volunteers" would continue their advance with the North Korean Army and achieve the "complete liberation of Korea."
- (2) The Chinese Communists have made no serious attempts to reach agreement on a cease-fire; instead, their actions have deliberately frustrated UN efforts to negotiate a cease-fire.
- (3) Current Communist military operations are of an offensive nature.
- (4) All Chinese units originally identified in North Korea still remain in the area and reinforcements in the form of both replacement battalions and regular divisions and armies have entered Korea over the past two months.
- (5) Large movements of supplies have continued into North Korea from Manchuria and recent field reports indicate a substantial movement of North Korean troops southward from training areas in Manchuria.

~~SECRET~~